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Fraud Exprosed Whot you Dont Could Cost your company millions - Joseph W.

Joseph W. Fraud Exprosed Whot you Dont Could Cost your company millions - Wiley Publishing, 2003. - 289 p.
ISBN: 0-471-27475-5
Download (direct link): fraudexposedwhatyoudont2003.pdf
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The terrain here may indeed be rugged. Donald Soeken, a clinical psychologist at Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C., and his wife, a statistician at the University of Maryland, conducted a study of 233 whistleblowers in 1989. They found those likely to make such disclosures were family men in their forties, possessed of a strong conscience, and maintaining high moral values. Their
experiences, however, were disheartening: 90 percent were fired or demoted, 26 percent had to seek physical or psychological care, 15 percent divorced, 10 percent attempted suicide, and 8 percent went bankrupt. Even so, 84 percent said they would do it again in the same circumstances.55
Such unfortunate consequences are not, it seems, unknown even in agencies whose primary mission is the detection and prosecution of misconduct. Martin Edward Andersen was a manager in the U.S. Department of Justice who complained in 199 7 of what he called “‘ a cesspool of official misconduct,’ including sexual favoritism in hiring, breaches of security and visa fraud in the department’s overseas criminal training program.” For these acts, he alleged, he was stripped of his security clearance and transferred to a meaningless job in a warehouse. After years of legal wrangling, he was finally awarded a cash settlement, and in 2001, after he voluntarily left the Department of Justice, he received a pubic service award from the Office of Special Counsel. Speaking of such situations, James E. Fisher, director of the Emerson Electric Center for Business Ethics at St. Louis University, commented: “The lone whistle-blower is often set up against a powerful corporate or government entity with more resources and power.... From the get-go, you have the likelihood of retaliation.” Commenting on such situations, author Marci Alboher Nusbaum noted that while all but 15 states have some form of general whistleblower legislation, the protections afforded the employee are still a “patchwork.”56 Forensic practitioners are not in the identical position to whistleblowers since it is their job to discover bad news, yet even they may be censured for doing their jobs aggressively and well.
It will be unfortunate and unproductive if forensic professionals are viewed only as snitches or persons intent on playing a serious game of gotcha. Forensic professionals as pathologist have much to offer the organization beyond the immediate issues of who is doing something wrong. By training and the nature of their duties, they are one of the few entities in the organization that is interested in “looking under the hood,” and not just seeing how fast someone can make the machine run. In this regard, they can be of immense immediate and long-term benefit to the organization well beyond the scope of their official duties.
Authors Argyris and Schon have written extensively of the issue of organizational learning and the peculiar strengths and weaknesses that organizations exhibit. Many of the issues they raise are pertinent to our consideration of the role of pathologist as an aid in the enterprise of organizational learning.
First, they note there are many way to conceive of the organization. These may include conceptualizations of it as an arena of social psychology and group dynamics; a structure of authority and information flow; an institution for the achievement of social objectives; a culture; or as a theater for the interplay of conflicts of interest.57 To some degree, they contend, each of these perspectives has merit and, to the degree it is adopted as a frame of reference, has meaning for how the organization may be said to learn. Such learning, however, can occur only through the media of individuals—the persons who constitute the
organization. Given this fact, there may be serious impediments for the achievement of learning by the organization, since information flow, particularly when the news is not good, may be severely constricted.
This may be the fault of the individuals themselves, who believe that rather than report bad news, with a little additional work on their part it can be turned into good news. Also, they instinctively understand that bad news is often not well received at the top. Were they so inclined to send bad news upward, they also understand that senior management usually adopts an orientation that requires that bad news be accompanied by proposed solutions in the same package— thus more disincentive to send the bad news upward.
Once middle management is in receipt of the bad news, they also have a tendency not to report it upward. Accordingly, it goes forward, if at all, in smaller, manageable pieces. Thus they contend, does upper management receive bad news in incremental bites, usually with firm assurances that those below have the situation under control and will have it resolved promptly. The net effect of these dynamics is that those at the bottom of the ladder, where the problem was first surfaced, remain ignorant and frustrated by the fact that bad news was reported and top management apparently is doing nothing about it.
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