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Within these basic goal types, there are sets of possible conditions. A condition is something that characterizes a particular aspect of the given goal type. Some conditions for the first two goal types are:
MUTUAL GOAL PURSUIT outside opposition outside help
difficulties along the way strange strategies apparent success apparent failure
COMPETITION GOAL compromise solution opponent quits opponent gets stronger outside help
difficulties along the way strange strategies apparent success apparent failure despicable tactics by opponent opponent changes colors
The above are illustrative of the kinds of TOPs that there are, Similar TOPs exist for the possibilities associated with success and failure. One of these we have already used is ACHIEVE SUCCESS; UTILIZE POWER in the Nixon and the Mayor of New Haven story.
The primary issue with respect to TOPs is their usefulness as memory structures and hence as processing structures . While MOPs are specific to
,, given domain, TOPs encode domain-independent knowledge. TOPs contain information that will apply in many different domains, Clearly we have such domain-independent knowledge. The question is whether memories are stored in terms of such structures. Note here that we are not suggesting that any memory is stored only in terms of TOPs. As we suggested in Chapter 6, there are MOPs that contain knowledge pertinent to negotiations and treaties. But there are also TOPs active in such situations that are useful for bringing in memories involving other domains of knowledge that may have relevance in the current situation.
Thus, for example, CG;CS might well be an active TOP in a negotiation story.
Let us now consider two reminding experiences:
X was about to go out for lunch with Y, Y specifically asked X to go to a restaurant that served pizza because Y was on a diet and would be able to order one slice of pizza at this restaurant X agreed When they got there Y ordered two slices. This reminded X of the time that he went out to dinner with Z. X wanted to go to a Mexican restaurant and Z was on a diet so she wanted fish. She suggested a Mexican restaurant that served fish. X didn’t like this restaurant but he agreed, When they got there Z ordered salad (which she could have gotten at any Mexican restaurant).
When W heard the above story she was reminded of making an appointment with a student at the only time the student could make it. This time was very inopportune for W but she agreed, At the agreed upon time, the student failed to show up.
Both of the above stories use the TOP we had used before for the argument that we mentioned above, namely COMPETING GOAL; COMPROMISE SOLUTION (CG;CS). The indices in case I are diet, restaurant, feeling had, and the characterization reneged on promise. In case J we have CG;CS and the reneged on promise and feeling had indices. Cases I and J and the Middle East Crisis share nothing in common in the way of context, yet they rely upon the same structure in memory for storage and learning. The consequence of this is not that one episode is likely to remind someone of the other (the indices would be different), but that information about how to deal with people in such situations can be applied across contexts.
Thus, various types of learning might take place. We might expect that next time X will be less likely to agree to a compromise with a person who is dieting when it comes to choosing restaurants. That is the lowest level conclusion possible here. Across contexts, if X were one of the Arab or
Israeli negotiators, it is possible he would be more skeptical of deals in those domains as well. It may not seem logical to apply what happened to you in a restaurant to a decision about an international negotiation, but people make such domain-crossing conclusions all the time. Sometimes such transferial across domains is exactly the right thing to do. Sometimes generalizations derived in this way are quite silly. Nevertheless, people can learn from experiences across contexts. That is, it is possible to draw a conclusion such as “never trust anybody under five feet three” from cases] and J as well. If X is the negotiator and his counterpart is under five foot three we might expect him to apply what he has learned. Whether he does or not, the point is that people have the ability to draw high level conclusions from what they experience, TOPs are required in order to get these remindings and in order to learn from these remindings.
Other types of TOPs
Consider case K:
X was talking about how there was no marijuana around for a month or two. Then, all of a sudden, everyone was able to get as much as they wanted. But the price had gone up 25 percent This reminded X of the oil situation the previous year, We were made to wait on lines because of a shortage that cleared up as soon as the price had risen a significant amount.
The TOP that we propose as the one active in case Ę is POSSESSION GOAL: COMMODITY UNAVAILABLE (PG;CU) There are, of course, a great many possible plans available for possessing something, In Schank and Abelson (1977), we discussed the plan D-CONTROL, which contained seven planboxes for getting what you wanted. Some of these were ASK: BARGAIN; THREATEN; and OVERPOWER, Now we are suggesting that just as is the case with scripts, plans are also memory and processing structures at the same time, Thus, the particular methods we use can serve to organize memories, as do scripts. But, it seems clear that a structure such as POSSESSION GOAL; ASK is much too general. It is unlikely that such a structure would be useful since far too many experiences would be categorized under it.