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Dynamic Memory. A Theory of Reminding and Learning in Computers and People - Schank R.C.

Schank R.C. Dynamic Memory. A Theory of Reminding and Learning in Computers and People - Cambridge University Press, 1982. - 250 p.
Download (direct link): dinamycmemory1982.djvu
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Normanís disagreement was a disagreement about the goals of the
Dynamic memory
server in the cafeteria. He claimed that she did not have the goal of suckering Schank. Schank did not believe that she had that goal either and they latei argued about the meaning of the word sucker, but that ^ not the point here. The point is that Norman believes that suckering referred only to the intent to defraud and not to the feeling of having been suckered. Because he believed this, he constructed in his head Ų scenario in which a server served food to a customer that turned out to be different (in a negative way) from what he expected. Different from what he expected is, of course, the key item in memory. Such differences must be explained. Norman had constructed an explanation of his gypsy incident that had her goal being poor ly assessed as participate in normal food seller script where it was actually use ruse of food seller script to cheat customer out of money.
In creating a scene in his head that corresponded to his definition of suckering, he created a scenario with an expectation failure that needed explanation. In constructing an ME for that scenario, he came across a memory that had that ME as its index, hence the reminding.
It is important to point out here that Normanís suckering and Schank's story both involve not only misperceived goals and the feeling of being suckered, but the situation of being served food as well. These correspond to an identity of context (food serving as the initial memory organizer for prediction and understanding), prediction failure (resulting in feeling suckered) and explanation (misperceived goals). This latter identity is between Normanís belief in what suckering would have been (that is, not Schankís actual story because he didnít view that as suckering) and Normanís experience with the gypsy.
Summing up
We have outlined here a way of storing and finding memories based on prediction failures. Intrinsic to such a scheme must be a set of structures in memory that generate predictions for use in processing (understanding). The next question is, What are the structures that memory uses to process inputs and store memories? Once we have isolated a sensible set of these structures, our next step, considering what we have proposed here, will be to show how such structures are selected for processing, how memories are organized within them, and how failure-driven memories are used for explanation, generalization, and learning. Finally, we shall have to show how reminding can cause these structures to change.
The examples we used here were all situations in which the person being reminded had the possibility of modifying his memory as a result of
failure-driven memory
j,js reminding experience. Having had an expectation fail, and having had to explain that failure, the individual was then in the position of having to alter his mental structures in some way. The point is simply this: reminding is, in many cases, the impetus to the automatic modification of oneís memory structures. Reminding is thus very closely related to understanding and learning. And, most significantly, it is from failures that we learn the most. A memory that gets what it expects every time would never develop in any interesting way. Reminding, expectation failure, and learning, are all intimately connected.
Cross-contextual reminding
There are three different kinds of reminding that are relevant for generalization and learning in processing. These different remindings occur at different points during processing with different purposes. They are:
In the initial part of processing, we must find a relevant processing structure. Thus, we must choose a restaurant script or some other high level structure as a source of predictions. Often the selected structure is very tightly linked to a particular episode in memory. It follows that in some cases the best available structure will be that specific episode One would thus get reminded at that point in processing, This type of reminding occurs, therefore, before any deviation from normal experience, or any expectation failure.
Failure explanation
In Chapter 3 we described reminding that is caused by the need to explain an expectation failure. This kind of reminding occurs when a processing structure has been selected, and an expectation from that structure has failed, and an explanation has been created.
Intentional planning-aids
Sometimes we seek answers to questions we have posed to ourselves, and, in finding those answers we get reminded. The other two types of reminding noted above are remindings that occur unintentionally. We just get reminded in the normal course of doing something else in processing. However , there are times when we are quite deliberately searching memory for something. When we do not know exactly what we were
Qoss-contextual reminding
looking for, sometimes we will find an episode that we did not consciously realize we had, yet which turns out to be what we were looking for after all. When what we were doing was attempting to follow a plan, or create our own, we have Intentional Planning-Aids Reminding.
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