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To construct the AB, we need only attempt to explain hei lack of common sense. (Note that this explanation need not be grounded in beliefs. Drunkenness or childishness may suffice as explanations.) Using the possibility that the easiest plan may appear to her to be the best, we construct the AB. Use the easiest plan despite information to the contrary. This is used as an index under the goal of FIND (X). At that point, the
drunk and the lamppost aie also indexed, they being an instance of the same phenomenon exactly.
The value of such indexing seems clear enough In the case of out own planning, we want to remember plan-failures so that we do not make the same mistake again. In observing others’ plans, we may want to help them if their plans do not vitally affect us, or simply not allow bad planners to get the opportunity to partake in plans that do vitally affect us. For the father in case D, after explaining his daughter’s failure, his reminding was rather useless. Drawing the analogy between drunks and small children may be amusing, but the learning there is negligible.
One cannot have an error in a goal in the same way that one can pursue the wrong plan, or do an action that was wrong. Explanations are necessary when goals are involved if we have made a prediction error that was caused by our own problems in correctly assessing a situation. In other words, we need to know what we misunderstood about another person’s goal. It is easy to misperceive someone else’s goal. We can also believe that someone has the wrong goal for his needs. Perhaps more significantly, we can decide that someone’s goals conflict with ours, and are wrong in the sense that they affect us negatively.
We seek a motivational explanation when we decide that a person knew exactly what they were doing and made no error. That is, we choose ME’S when there are no possible EE’S Thus ME’S come into play when explanations are necessary to account for people performing actions that we did not expect, due to our misperception of their goals or motivations behind their plans. ME’S are also relevant when we predict poorly because of a conscious assessment of an actor’s goals that turns out to be wrong.
The failure to accurately predict someone’s behavior then, can often depend on our failure to accurately assess his goals. We can also fail to be adequately prepared for dealing with a goal that another person turns out to have. These are not failures of prediction exactly We may not even have been aware that this person had the goal that he had. It is even possible that we might not have been aware of the other person’s existence. Nevertheless, we can encounter difficulties in our lives that are the result of our not knowing about another’s goals. In those cases, as well as in the cases we have talked about above, we need to record our errors and the explanation of those errors for use in future understanding, and to enable us to learn from those experiences.
pailure-driven memory 59
ä5 an example of the kind of reminding that is relevant here consider n episode taken fiom Norman & Schank, 1982. Since the names are printed there, we shall keep them here.
fke suckering sequences
Norman and Schank went to one of the cafeterias at the University of California at San Diego for lunch. Schank got into the sandwich line, where the server, a young woman, was slicing pieces of meat off of big chunks of roast beef, ham, corned beef, etc. Schank saw the nice looking piece of meat that was exposed on the side of the cut roast beef, and ordered a roast beef sandwich. However, the server had previously sliced some beef off the side, and she took this previously sliced beef for the sandwich. It wasn’t nearly as nice as the meat that was still unsliced.
When they sat down at the table in the dining room, Schank turned to Norman and said, “Boy, have I ever been suckered!” He explained what had happened.
Norman sia, “No, you haven’t been suckered, because my impression of the word suckered is that it implies a serious attempt to defraud.” “You want a real suckering experience?” Normal asked. “On our trip to Spain, we were driving across the country and we came to this tiny little village. We went in to a little store run by someone who looked just like a gypsy lady. We bought some cheese, and great bread, and really nice looking sausage, and some wine. Then we had it all wrapped up and we drove out of the town. We parked in a secluded location, found a hill with some trees, climbed up to the top and sat down looking out over the beautiful countryside. Then we opened the wine and unwrapped the food. Garbage. All there was was garbage, carefully wrapped garbage. Now that was a suckering experience. The gypsy lady suckered us.”
The question here is how Norman got reminded of his suckering experience. According to our theory, there had to be some explanation that was indexed under a prediction failure that was used by Norman to retrieve the memory. What failure have we got here? The script necessary for understanding Schank’s story went without a hitch. No error was made. Indeed, it was not Norman hearing about the events that transpired that reminded Norman of his story. Rather, it was Norman’s reaction to Schank’s analysis of what had happened to him that reminded Norman of his story. Norman did not believe that Schank’s story was an instance of suckering. This disagreement caused the reminding. Now the question is, “How?”