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Valuation Measuring and managing the value ofpanies - Koller T.

Koller T., Murrin J. Valuation Measuring and managing the value ofpanies - Wiley & sons , 2000. - 508 p.
ISBN 0-471-36190-9
Download (direct link): valuationmeasuringandmanaging2000.pdf
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16—
Valuing Cyclical Companies
Volatile earnings introduce additional complexity into the valuation of cyclical companies. In this chapter, we explore how the share prices of cyclical companies behave. This leads to a suggested approach to valuing these companies and potential implications for managers.
Share Price Behavior of Cyclical Companies
Cyclical companies are characterized by significant fluctuations in earnings over a number of years. Earnings of such companies, including those in the steel, airline, paper, and chemical industries, fluctuate because of big changes in the prices of their products. In the airline industry, for example, cyclicality of earnings is linked to broader macroeconomic trends. In the paper industry, cyclicality is largely driven by industry factors, typically related to capacity.
The share prices of companies with cyclical earnings are often more volatile than less cyclical companies. Is this consistent with the DCF valuation approach? At first glance, theory and reality don't coincide.
When Theory and Reality Conflict
Let's explore the theory. Suppose that you were valuing a cyclical company using the DCF approach and you had perfect foresight about the industry cycle. Would the value of the company behave similar to the earnings? No, the DCF value would exhibit much lower volatility than the
This chapter is based on an analysis for a dissertation, Underestimating Change (Rotterdam: Erasmus University, August 1999), by Marco de Heer under the supervision of one of the co-authors.
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earnings or cash flows. DCF reduces future expected cash flows to a single value. As a result, any single year is not important. For a cyclical company, the high cash flows cancel out the low cash flows. Only the long-term trend really matters.
An example will clarify how this works. The business cycle of Company A is 10 years. Exhibit 16.1, part 1, shows its hypothetical cash flow pattern. It is highly volatile, containing both positive and negative cash flows. Discounting the free cash flows at 10 percent produces the DCF values in Exhibit 16.1, part 2.
Exhibit 16.1, part 3, which brings together the cash flows and the DCF value (the values are indexed for comparability), shows that the DCF value is far less volatile than the underlying cash flow. In fact, there is almost no volatility in the value. This is because no single year's performance has a significant impact on the value of the company.
In the real world, of course, the share prices of cyclical companies are less stable. Exhibit 16.2 shows the earnings and share values (indexed) for 15 companies with a four-year cycle. The share prices are more volatile than the DCF approach would predict—suggesting that theory and reality conflict.
Exhibit 16.1 The Long-Term View: Free Cash Flow and DCF Volatility
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Exhibit 16.2 Share Prices and EPS for 15 Cyclical Companies
Are Earnings Forecasts the Culprit?
How can we reconcile theory and reality? We examined the earnings forecasts for cyclical companies to see if they provided any clues on the assumption that the market values of the companies would be linked to consensus earnings forecasts.
What we found was quite surprising. Consensus earnings forecasts for cyclical companies appeared to ignore cyclicality entirely. The forecasts invariably showed an upward sloping trend, regardless of whether the companies were at the peak or trough of the cycle. It appeared not that the DCF model was inconsistent with the facts but that the earnings and cash flow projections of the market (assuming the market followed the analysts' consensus) were to blame.
The conclusion was based on an analysis of 36 U.S. cyclical companies during the years 1985-1997. We divided them into groups with similar cycles (e.g., three, four, or five years from peak to trough), and calculated scaled average earnings and earnings forecasts. We then compared actual earnings with consensus earnings forecasts over the cycle.1
Exhibit 16.3 plots the actual earnings and consensus earnings forecast for the set of 15 companies with four-year cycles in primary metals and manufacturing transportation equipment. The consensus forecasts do not predict the earnings cycle at all. In fact, except for the ''next-year forecasts" in the years beginning from the trough, the earnings-per-share are forecasted to
1 Note that we have already adjusted downward the normal positive bias of analyst forecasts to focus just on the cyclicality issue. V.K. Chopra, "Why So Much Error in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts?" Financial Analysts Journal (November/December 1998), pp. 35-42.
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Exhibit 16.3 Actual EPS and Consensus EPS Forecasts for Cyclical Companies
follow an upward sloping path with no future variation. You might say that the forecast doesn't even acknowledge the existence of a cycle.2
One explanation could be that equity analysts have incentives not to predict the cycle, particularly the down part. Academic research has shown that earnings forecasts have a general positive bias that is sometimes attributed to the incentives facing equity analysts at investment banks.3 For example, pessimistic earnings forecasts may damage relations between an analyst's employer—an investment bank—and a particular company. In addition,
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